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Abstract 
This contribution analyses if and how the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) work as  security 
community-building instruments in EU–Moldova relations –whether, 
how and to what extent the EU has managed to promote security and 
stability through the externalization of rules and values. We adopt the 
framework developed by Rieker (2014), which holds that building an 
effective security community requires a certain level of integration 
combined with a certain level of attractiveness. Our study examines the 
level of Moldova’s integration with the EU and the domestic support for 
such integration, based on four main indicators: scope/ 
comprehensiveness of the association, level of adaption/external 
Europeanization, level of participation/contribution and the level of 
attractiveness of the EU. We conclude that the ENP/EaP has been 
relatively successful in stepping up the political and economic 
integration of Moldova into the EU, but that the process of building a 
security community is still not mature enough to 'lock' Moldova into a 
sustainable path towards European integration. 
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 Introduction 
To what extent has Moldova become integrated into the EU? Here we 
focus on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), developing since 
2004, and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) policy, operational since 
2009. We adopt the framework developed by Rieker (2014), which 
holds that building an effective security community requires a certain 
level of integration combined with a certain level of attractiveness. Our 
study examines the level of Moldova’s EU integration, using four main 
indicators: scope/comprehensiveness of the association, level of 
adaption/external Europeanization, level of participation/contribution, 
and level of attractiveness of the EU.  
 
Mapping the level of integration: According to Rieker, the basic idea 
is that the EU is a security building institution and that security 
building beyond EU borders is dependent on the neighbouring 
country’s level of integration and the Union’s perceived attractiveness. 
(Rieker 2014: 7). Rieker operationalizes the level of integration as 
follows: First, she defines the scope/comprehensiveness of association 
in terms of the scope of association agreements: 'The need to study the 
scope of association agreements builds on the assumption that the 
broader the scope of the association is – in terms of comprehensiveness 
(the policy areas it covers) and dynamism – the more integrated will 
the associated country be'. We therefore present an overview of all the 
areas that are covered by the association agreement with Moldova. 
Second, Rieker underlines the importance of the level of adaptation/ 
external Europeanization, which she defines as 'the degree of 
adaptation in terms of adjustment made to EU rules, norms and values 
at the national level' and 'determining the degree of adaptations to EU 
rules (or Europeanization). We examine Moldova's level of adaptation 
in the areas of democracy promotion and good governance, the rule of 
law and respect for human rights, market economy principles, and 
trade and trade-related acquis. Third, Rieker identifies the level of 
participation/contribution: 'The higher the degree of participation in 
EU policies and the more committed a country is, the more likely will it 
be to build a security community' (Rieker 2014: 10). We examine the 
level of participation of Moldova based on 'active' and 'passive' 
participation in EU policies and agencies, including processes of 
Europeanization. Fourth and finally, Rieker defines the level of 
attractiveness of the EU as an important measure of integration, 
because 'the level of support from the domestic political leadership and 
important constituencies in the partner country will be crucial for the 
EU to succeed as a regional security actor' (Rieker 2014: 11). We focus 
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our analysis of how attractive the EU is to Moldova by assessing 
benefits and access (what's in it for the partner country?) and the 
relative attractiveness of the ENP/EaP as against that of Russia as a 
'competing external actor' (Rieker 2014: 7).  
 
We chose Moldova as a case study.1 Of all the countries in the EU's 
closer neighbourhood, Moldova is currently regarded as a frontrunner 
as regards EU integration, having made significant progress in 
reforming its foreign policy alongside its domestic political and 
economic system in line with EU norms and standards. Therefore, we 
expect EU security community building to be more advanced in 
Moldova than in the other EaP countries. The extent to which the EU 
has expanded its security community to Moldova will indicate how 
close the EU is to influencing European integration dynamics in the 
EaP region as a whole. 
By way of conclusion, we critically reflect on the future of Moldova 
in the European integration process, and discuss the limitations of a 
post-sovereign collective security project in a region that continues to 
be governed by balance-of-power politics and the security of sovereign 
statehood. 
   
                                                          
1  The authors conducted 20 semi-structured interviews with EU officials and 
representatives of the Moldovan government, including the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Parliament as well as with independent researchers and civil society 
representatives. Interviews took place between July 2013 and January 2014. 
 Moldova and EU integration 
In this section, we analyse the level of integration with the EU in terms 
of the scope of the agreements, the level of adaptation to EU standards 
and the level of participation in EU policies and agencies. According to 
Rieker (2014) this will give an indication of whether the EU can be 
regarded as a security community-building institution in Moldova. 
Scope of EU agreements  
The scope of Moldova’s agreements with the EU is comprehensive. The 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed with Moldova in 
1994 aimed at providing an appropriate framework for political 
dialogue, the promotion of trade and investment and harmonious 
economic relations between the parties, fostering sustainable economic 
development, providing a basis for legislative, economic, social, 
financial and cultural cooperation and supporting efforts of Moldova to 
consolidate its democracy and develop its economy so as to complete 
the transition to a market economy. Like all PCAs concluded with the 
former Soviet Union countries, the one with Moldova was primarily an 
economic cooperation instrument (limited economic scope), though 
containing in its general principles section an article stipulating that 
respect for democracy, principles of international law, and human 
rights constitute an 'essential element' of the agreement (PCA Moldova: 
6). The PCA also introduced procedures for political dialogue between 
the parties and established three bilateral institutions: Moldova 
Cooperation Council (meetings at the ministerial level), the Co-
operation Committee (meetings at the senior officials level), and the 
Parliamentary Co-operation Committee, composed of MPs of the 
European Parliament and the parliament of Moldova. Many provisions 
of the PCA, however, still remained to be implemented by Moldova at 
the time of the entry into force of the ENP.  
The ENP did not lead to new contractual relations between the EU 
and Moldova; however, the ENP Action Plan set out a roadmap for 
enhanced relations, including conditionality (soft law). The priorities of 
the Action Plan (AP) were much wider in scope and went beyond 
economic cooperation. They included the perspective of moving 
beyond cooperation to a significant degree of integration (a stake in the 
EU’s Internal Market), and the possibility for Moldova to participate 
progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programmes and 
participation in Community programmes; an upgrade in the scope and 
intensity of political cooperation and the opportunity for convergence 
of economic legislation; the continued reduction of trade barriers; and 
increased financial support/technical assistance (ENP Action Plan: 2–
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3). The EU formally required Moldova to adopt the acquis. According to 
the AP, 'The level of ambition of the relationship will depend on the 
degree of Moldova’s commitment to common values as well as its 
capacity to implement jointly agreed priorities. The pace of progress of 
the relationship will acknowledge fully Moldova’s efforts and concrete 
achievements in meeting those commitments.' (ENP Action Plan 2004: 
1). 
Since 2009, Moldova has been included in the EU’s more ambitious 
partnership, the Eastern Partnership (EaP), as ‘a growing responsibility 
to the partners, to help them address the political and economic 
challenges that they face and to support their aspirations for closer ties’ 
(European Commission 2008: 2). Replacing the former PCA, the EU–
Moldova Association Agreement (AA) aims to enhance the institutional 
framework with the EU, and deepen political association and economic 
integration, implying reciprocal obligations and rights. The AA was 
initialled at the EaP summit in Vilnius in November 2013. Overall, the 
scope of the AA is considered comprehensive, balanced and broad in 
scope. As noted by one interviewee: ‘the scope of the AA is quite broad 
especially if we compare it to the earlier PCA. It is highly detailed, is 
accompanied by various EU support mechanisms, it leaves margins for 
manoeuvre, and it expects progress’2. To a certain degree it is 
comparable to the 35 chapters that an EU candidate county must 
negotiate: although structured differently, the AA covers almost all 
issues incorporated in the 35 chapters3. It is a highly ambitious 
document that expects a wide range of reforms to be implemented, a 
high degree of participation in EU programmes and in regional 
development, cross-border and civil society cooperation. It is a reform 
agenda aimed at regulatory approximation to the EU, political 
association and economic integration. Moldova is expected to engage 
in considerable reforms in the following areas covered by the AA: (i) 
political dialogue and reform, cooperation in the field of foreign and 
security policy; (ii) justice, freedom and security issues; (iii) economic 
and other sector cooperation (including civil society cooperation) and 
(iv) trade and trade-related matters (AA, 2013). These four chapters 
reflect reforms based on criteria established in the ENP: the promotion 
of democracy respect for human rights, rule of law, good governance, 
market economy principles and sustainable development. Unlike the 
                                                          
2  Interview with independent expert, consultant to the Moldovan MFA, September 
2013. 
3  The EU-Moldova Association Agreement counts over 1000 pages and consists of 
the followings: A Preamble as an introductory statement of the Agreement, setting 
out the Agreement’s purpose and underlying philosophy; seven Titles: General 
Principles; Political Cooperation and Foreign and Security Policy; Justice Freedom 
and Security; Trade and Trade-related Matters (DCFTA); Economic and Sector 
Cooperation; Financial Cooperation with Anti-Fraud Provisions, as well as 
Institutional, General and Final Provisions; 35 Annexes setting out EU legislation to 
be incorporated by a specific date and four Protocols. 
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candidate countries, however, Moldova is not promised membership in 
the EU. 
Some of the areas have been higher up on the political agenda of the 
Moldovan government during negotiations, such as cooperation in the 
sphere of justice, freedom and security (hereafter JFS) and trade and 
trade-related matters. The framework of the JFS chapter within the AA 
is based on the Justice and Home Affairs section within the Action Plan, 
but is perceived as more comprehensive and more ambitious4. It 
represents a reform agenda in the fields of justice, internal affairs and 
human rights (cooperation on migration, asylum and border 
management; cooperation on the fight against illicit drugs; money 
laundering and terrorism financing; combating terrorism; movement of 
persons; preventing and combating organized crime and corruption 
and other illegal activities). Furthermore, the issue of mobility and visa 
liberalization, as components of the JFS, have been widely addressed 
by Moldova and the EU; and as a result, formulations on the JFS have 
been included in such a way as to represent the progress made in the 
area of the visa dialogue (Caras 2011). The main focus here is on 
integrated border management, visa liberalization and security 
standards, as well as reform in the judicial and police fields – which are 
closely related to human rights issues and combating corruption 
(European Commission 2008). There has been less negotiation 
concerning the Transnistrian issue, which remains a central point 
within the political dialogue and reform, cooperation in the field of 
foreign and security policy chapter of the AA. All these areas involve a 
high degree of legislation harmonization or in some cases even 
initiation of new legislation, i.e. adopting EU legislation in areas like 
environment, trade, education or transportation. In turn, this indicates 
the strong reform commitment undertaken by the Moldovan 
government when it initialled the AA. 
The EU and Moldova have also concluded negotiations on a Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). The main 
objective of the DCFTA is to bring Moldovan legislation closer to EU 
legislation in trade and trade-related areas5. The DCFTA – the EU’s new 
                                                          
4  Interviews with Moldovan civil servants (Moldovan parliament, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, State Chancellery, Ministry of Justice) and independent expert, consultant 
to the Moldovan MFA, September-November 2013. 
5  Title IV: Trade and trade-related matters has the following objective: 'The Parties 
shall progressively establish a free trade area over a transitional period of 
maximum 10 years starting from the entry into force of this Agreement' and 
includes the following articles: 1. National treatment and market access for goods; 
2. Trade remedies; Technical Barriers to trade; 3. Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary 
measures; 4. Customs and trade facilitation, 5. Establishment, Trade in Services; 6. 
Current Payments and movement of capital; 7. Public Procurement; 8. Intellectual 
Property; 9. Competition; 10. Trade related energy; 11. Transparency; 12. Trade 
and sustainable development. 
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generation of FTAs – is ‘deep’ in the sense that it requires partners to 
adopt up to 80% of the EU’s trade and trade-related acquis. The DCFTA 
goes beyond the scope of the PCA, to include 'behind the border' 
obstacles to free trade, including intellectual property rights, technical 
barriers to trade (TBT), sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards (SPS) 
and trade-related investment measures, alongside what have been 
called the 'Singapore issues', including EU acquis on mergers, 
competition and state aid, public procurement and environmental/ 
social standards.6 However, the DCFTA should not be interpreted as a 
tool for deeper integration. It does not offer partners any say in EU 
decision-making; nor does it give them any higher level of access to EU 
aid/redistribution mechanisms, or, importantly, full access to the EU 
markets in the short and medium term (Messerlin et al. 2011: 5).  
Prior to opening negotiations on the DCFTA, the Commission issued 
a set of key and additional recommendations to the Moldovan 
government in October 2010, listing thirteen thematic areas in which 
additional progress was required. These included market access for 
goods, tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs), technical barriers to trade 
(TBT), sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), trade facilitation 
and customs administration, rules of origin, services and investment, 
intellectual property rights (IPR), public procurement (PP) and 
competition (European Commission 2010).7 
Level of adaptation/alignment  
With all issues addressed by the chapters of the AA, approximation to 
the EU acquis is required. Moldova is considered a frontrunner in the 
ENP and EaP due to its high level of compliance with the EU rules and 
norms. The EaP Index also shows Moldova as the best performer in 
terms of approximation, coming in first among the six EaP members 
(see Table 1). This refers to how closely the institutions and policies of 
a country resemble those of the EU member-states, how they converge 
towards EU standards and whether these are in line with EU 
requirements. As Table 1 shows, Moldova scores highest in the area of 
democracy and JFS, and relatively high as regards the rule of law. 
 
                                                          
6  The ENP/EaP coincided with the revision of the EU’s trade policy instruments 
towards encouraging 'deep trade'. Deep trade is the attempt by the EU to liberalize 
trade not only by removing trade barriers ‘at the border’ (reduction of tariff barriers) 
but also ‘behind the border’ (domestic rules preventing FDI and trade in services, or 
the lack of domestic labour/environmental standards giving a competitive 
advantage to domestic over EU producers, etc.). See Young and Peterson (2006). 
7 The application of conditionality before opening DCFTA negotiation was 
unprecedented in EU FTA practice. Even Ukraine –the worst implementer of EU 
acquis – was not required to fulfil such preconditions prior to starting its DCFTA 
negotiations. 
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Table 1. Approximation rate of EaP countries to the EU 
 
Sector 
cooperation 
Approximation indices (1=best performer; 0=worst performer) 
 Moldova Georgia Ukraine Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus 
Democracy 0.72 0.54 0.64 0.47 0.31 0.20 
Rule of law 0.61 0.63 0.60 0.51 0.42 0.23 
Justice, 
Freedom and 
Security  
0.94 0.67 0.76 0.47 0.76 0.43 
Trade and 
Economic 
Cooperation 
0.71 0.54 0.72 0.54 0.57 0.38 
Source:  Author’s compilation based on EaP Index 2013. 
 
According to experts’ evaluation, Moldova has made very good 
progress in laying down a comprehensive legislative, one more 
compatible with the regulatory environment (EaP Index 2013). 
The relevant legislative framework is largely in place, with some of its 
elements pending approval by Parliament.8 As data from the Centre of 
the Harmonization of Legislation [with the EU acquis] show, till today 
Moldova has adopted 188 normative and legislative acts (see below 
Table 2). According to EU evaluation, despite the need for certain 
improvements, the instruments adopted and the drafts are largely in 
line with European and international standards (European Commission 
2012). 
                                                          
8  Interview with Moldovan civil servants, Moldovan parliament and Ministry of 
Justice, September 2013. 
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Table 2. EU acts transposed into Moldovan legislation, 2007–2013 
 
Field 
Number of adopted 
acts (normative and 
legislative) 
Agriculture and Rural development (incl. veterinary and zoo-technology) 83 
Industrial policy and internal market 26 
Environment, consumers and health protection 22 
Freedom, Security and Justice 12 
Work employment, equal chances and social policy 9 
The right to establish and freedom of offering services 8 
Enterprise law 7 
Transportation policy 4 
Energy policy 4 
General, financial and institutional matters 3 
Competition policy 3 
Customs Union and free movement of goods 2 
Fishing policy 2 
Economic and monetary policy and free circulation of capital 2 
Foreign Relations 1 
Other (taxation; science, information, education and culture etc.) 0 
Total 188 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the database of EU transposed acts 
available on the website of the Moldovan Ministry of Justice: 
http://justice.gov.md/tabview.php?l=ro&idc=225 
 
Democracy promotion, good governance and the rule of law. On the 
sectoral level, Moldova has conducted a wide range of reforms in 
accordance with EU standards. As regards good governance and the 
rule of law, the Moldovan government has progressed reforms in the 
justice sector and adjacent areas such as migration and border 
management. The strategy of the justice sector reform is currently being 
implemented.9 The most recent actions within these reforms have been 
the arrest, on charges of corruption charges, of five judges in early 
2014– the first time in the history of the country (Leancă 2014). In the 
sector of migration and border management, several reforms have been 
carried out as well. Take, for example, document security (including 
biometrics): today Moldova issues only biometric passports, and a new 
law on protecting personal data has been passed in accordance with EU 
standards. In the area of irregular immigration (including re-
admission), Moldova developed an Action Plan and implemented the 
Integrated Border Management Strategy. A precondition for effective 
fight against illegal migration or customs fraud, as expected by the EU, 
                                                          
9  Interview with Moldovan civil servant, Ministry of Justice, September 2013. 
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is the introduction of integrated border management (Canciani 2009). 
Moldova has modernized its border management procedures in 
compliance with the EU concept of integrated border management, 
based on the adoption of regular strategies and plans for integrated 
border management.10 Establishing integrated border management 
impact on such key policy areas as trade, customs, visa and mobility of 
persons. Moreover, there has been a drastic reform of the police. The 
border police forces have been demilitarized and incorporated into the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, salaries have been increased, and 
disciplinary procedures have been initiated against police officers 
accused of implication in corruption cases.  
Progress has been made also in relation to democracy promotion 
and respect for human rights. As regards human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, Moldova has ratified and made progress in 
implementing several international and European instruments, as 
required by the EU, such as the European Convention on the Legal 
Status of Migrant Workers, the UN Convention and Protocol relating to 
the Status of Refugees and the UN Convention on the Status of Stateless 
Persons. It has also created a Reception Centre for Asylum Seekers and 
a Temporary Placement Centre for Foreigners. Among the most 
sensitive legislation that has been passed are the Law on Equal 
Opportunities and the reform of the Anti-Corruption Centre.11 As 
Moldovan monitoring reports show, at the end of 2013 the government 
adopted a new draft law on the people’s advocate as well as progressed 
in organizing the activity of community mediators for Roma-populated 
communities and continued efforts to promote the social inclusion of 
persons with disabilities (ADEPT& Expert-Grup 2013). Another 
successful change is the incorporation in the National Human Rights 
Plan 2011–2014 of the recommendations of the Universal Periodic 
Review. 
On the other hand, Moldova’s track record also has certain 
deficiencies. Moldova has been lagging behind in the implementation 
of reforms,12 and, to cite Prime Minister Iurie Leancă (2014), ‘we need 
to do our homework’. Implementation of EU norms in some cases 
remains a challenge due to the lack of the necessary financial and 
human resources and a vision for a mainstream approach or political 
                                                          
10  Interview with Moldovan public policy consultant, Moldovan Border Police 
Department, September-November 2013. 
11  Interview with Moldovan public policy consultant, Moldovan Border Police 
Department, September-November 2013. 
12  Interviews with Moldovan civil servants, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September-
October 2013. 
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will.13 It is important to differentiate policy areas: as some Moldovan 
civil servants emphasize, the pace of reform is slower in certain areas 
than others because some entail political costs, whereas others are 
more technical in nature14. Data from the Centre of Harmonization at 
the Ministry of Justice show that there has been no real effort to create a 
roadmap for governmental decision-making, with a clear timeframe; 
moreover, there is insufficient coordination of all relevant ministries to 
fulfil EU obligations.15  
Table 3. Moldova’s progress 2005–2012 
 
Areas as established within the ENP AP Rating established 
 Nr value assessment 
Democracy and rule of law (democratic institutions, judicial system, 
administrative capacity and other sub-areas) 
2.3 modest 
Human rights and fundamental freedoms (minority rights, children’s 
rights, freedom of expression, prevention of, and the fight against, the 
trafficking in human beings, ill-treatment and torture and other sub-
areas) 
2.6 moderate 
Settlement of the Transnistrian conflict (border security, civil society 
and democracy and other related areas) 
1.5 minor 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on national evaluation of Moldova’s 
progress (Botan et al. 2013) 
 
Table 3 assesses Moldova’s progress 2005–2012 in the areas of 
democracy, human rights and rule of law.16 According to the authors of 
the evaluation of Moldova’s progress, the Moldovan authorities 
undertaken reforms for the sake of reporting back to the EU; Moldova is 
still lagging behind in areas like ensuring democracy and the rule of 
law (Botan et al. 2013). The report highlights that there are deficiencies 
in carrying out the judicial reform which leaves room for interference of 
interest groups, political involvement and corruption. Additionally, 
many actions foreseen in this area have not been implemented. In 
issues such as developing and implementing a legal framework 
appropriate for the prevention and fight against trafficking of human 
beings, Moldova has made modest progress. Low progress in the area 
                                                          
13  Interviews with Moldovan civil servants and public policy consultants (Parliament, 
State Chancellery, Moldovan Border Police Department, National Participation 
Council), September-November 2013. 
14  Interviews with Moldovan civil servant, State Chancellery, September 2013. 
15  Interview with Moldovan civil servants, State Chancellery and Moldovan 
Parliament, September 2013. 
16  Progress has been estimated by civil society representatives in charge of 
monitoring the Moldovan reform process according to EU standards on a level from 
0 to 5, 0 being the lowest and 5 being the highest, as well as relevant assessment – 
regression, no progress, modest, moderate, high. 
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of human rights is linked with the (poor) quality of the justice system in 
Moldova, but is also due to the fact that the driving forces in this field 
are external: ‘As a consequence, adoption of the legislation framework 
is not always followed by the development of effective mechanisms for 
human rights protection, while strengthening the existing mechanisms 
is not perceived as a priority. This approach of "half measures" does 
not allow an effective protection of human rights’ (Botan et al. 2013: 
24). 
Market economy principles. Moldova has a small and open economy. 
Agriculture plays a significant role. Of the countries in the EU’s Eastern 
neighbourhood, Moldova has been among the hardest hit by the global 
recession in 2008–09. Although the economy has recovered from the 
crisis (average annual GDP growth exceeding 5% in 2010–2013), 
economic growth has been volatile. Real GDP grew by 7.1% in 2010 
and 6.4% in 2011. In 2012, however, GDP contracted by 0.7% because 
of a drought that led to a contraction of GDP in agriculture (–22.3%).17 
However, according to the World Bank, Moldova has made significant 
strides in its economic and political transition, although ' much 
remains to be done'. Moldova lags behind the rest of the EaP region 
because it has a 'small domestic market with limited competition and 
weak drive for innovation' (World Bank 2014). The level of the market 
economy of Moldova is behind that of Armenia and Georgia (Table 4).18  
Table 4. Approximation rate of EaP countries to the EU 
 
Sector cooperation Approximation indices (1=best performer; 0=worst performer) 
Moldova Georgia Ukraine Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus 
Market Economy 
and DCFTA 
0.61 0.66 0.54 0.57 0.43 0.38 
Ease of Doing 
Business Index 
2013 
86 9 140 40 71 64 
Ease of Doing 
Business 2014 
78 8 112 37 70 63 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on EaP Index 2013 and World Bank Ease 
of Doing Business Index 2013/2014 
                                                          
17  In addition, exports from Moldova into the EU decreased due to the Eurozone crisis. 
Since 2013, the economy has been growing again, driven by a record agricultural 
harvest, with GDP increasing by 8% in 2013 (World Bank 2014). 
18  In addition, and despite the sharp decline in poverty statistics, Moldova remains 
one of the poorest countries in Europe. Based on the Europe and Central Asia (ECA) 
standardized poverty lines of USD 5/day and USD 2.5/day at Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP), 55% of the population were ‘poor’ and 10% ‘extremely poor’ (World 
Bank 2014). 
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On the other hand, Moldova has made progress in improving its 
business climate in recent years. It slightly improved its ranking in 
2014 to 78th place (out of 185) compared to 86th place in 2013 in the 
'ease of doing business ranking' in the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business 
2014’ annual report (World Bank 2014). However, according to the 
European Commission, 'despite this progress further reforms are still 
needed inter alia in countering the grey economy in the retail sector, 
and streamlining of the legislation' (European Commission 2012: 12). 
Indeed, foreign investors continue to cite serious problems with the 
Moldovan tax office and customs officials, including repeated cases of 
corporate raiding, which are still possible due to loopholes in 
Moldovan law and high levels of corruption among local judges. In 
2012, Moldova lost an estimated €60 million (25%) of its foreign direct 
investment because of the poor investment climate (Całus 2013). 
Adoption of trade and trade-related measures. Moldova adopted a 
significant amount of EU trade and trade-related acquis in 2012–13 (in 
order to qualify for the opening of DCFTA negotiations), including over 
4000 TBT standards, and 81 EC legal SPS related legal acts and 
regulations. Moldova has also begun amending its Customs Code, its 
legislation on customs tariffs and on free economic zones, as well as 
completing the implementation of its fair competition legislation. Other 
reforms include the introduction of new anti-monopoly regulations and 
a reform of the state body responsible for the prevention of unfair 
competition.  
Regarding SPS standards, a bilateral agreement with the EU on the 
protection of Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and 
Foodstuffs was ratified by Moldova in December 2012. This is expected 
to contribute, inter alia, to the diversification of wine production in the 
country. The Parliament also adopted a general food safety law in 2012 
which established a food safety agency, and a law on animal 
identification and traceability entered into force in 2012. Moldova has 
also further reduced technical barriers to trade: the law on 
standardization has been amended and the law on accreditation and 
conformity assessment entered into force. Amendments have been 
made to the law on metrology. Moldova has amended its Civil Code and 
other laws in respect of liability for defective products. A law on the 
industrial security of hazardous industrial objects has also been 
adopted. Still, according to the ENPI Index 2013, Moldova lags 
Armenia and Georgia in meeting DCFTA requirements (Table 4).  
 
Overall, actual implementation of the EU's trade and trade-related 
acquis has been moving very slowly. This is not only because immense 
resources are required, but also because the economic reform project 
continues to meet considerable resistance within Moldova – not in the 
form of ideological opposition, but because of the continued 
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entanglement of the government and parliament with oligarchic 
structures, corruption and vested interests of rent-seekers who want to 
maintain the status quo and/or favour cosmetic rather than substantive 
liberal economic reforms.19   
Level of participation in the EU 
Moldova's inclusion in the EaP offers the opportunity to deepen 
dialogue and cooperation, including participation in EU policies and 
programmes. Apart from identifying the form and frequency of 
meetings with the EU, we examine participation along two dimensions: 
the passive/ active participation of Moldova in EU policies/ 
programmes, and the socialization effects thereof on the Moldovan 
political elites (external Europeanization).  
Form and frequency of meetings with the EU. Meetings between 
Moldova and the EU have increased in the framework of the ENP and 
again with the EaP. EU–Moldova political dialogue continued to 
deepen throughout 2012 and 2013, and contacts between high-level 
officials intensified. For example, in April 2012 President Timofti paid 
a visit to Brussels, reciprocated by European Commission President 
Barroso in November. In February 2012, Commissioner De Gucht 
opened negotiations in Chisinau on establishing a DCFTA, and 
Commissioner Malmström met three times with the Moldovan Prime 
Minister in 2012 (ENP Progress Report Moldova: 2). Consultations also 
intensified between the Moldovan government and the EU Political and 
Security Committee, the Council Working Party on Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, and the Political Directors Troika.  
On the multilateral level, the head of states and governments of all 
EaP countries, including the Moldovan president, meet every two years 
at an EaP summit. Meetings of foreign ministers are held annually, 
whereas ministerial sectoral conferences/meetings among ministers 
responsible for various sectors take place on an ad hoc basis 
throughout the year. Multilateral platforms meet twice a year (four 
platforms: Democracy, Economic integration, Energy Security, Contacts 
between People) and involve senior Moldovan officials meeting other 
EaP senior officials and EU Commission officials. Working panels meet 
several times a year; these are meetings of officials from EaP countries, 
including from Moldova, who support the work of the multilateral 
platforms. The EaP parliamentary assembly (with 10 MPs from 
Moldova) meets twice a year. There are also annual meetings of several 
                                                          
19  Reforms have also stalled because of competition within the government, for 
example between the four parties in the Alliance for European Integration, which all 
catered for different electorates and struggled to act as a single force pushing for 
reform. For a discussion of the factors resisting liberal economic reforms in 
Moldova, see for example: International Centre for Policy Studies (2013).   
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other formations, such as the local and regional assembly of Eastern 
Europe and the South Caucasus or the Eastern Partnership Business 
Council. Last but not least, Moldova is active within the Civil Society 
(CS) Forum, the EU platform for EaP civil society cooperation, where 
common approaches on different democracy and good governance 
initiatives, including human rights, are discussed. The fact that in 2013 
the Forum was hosted in Moldova and not in Lithuania (the EU MS 
country hosting the Presidency) bears witness to Moldova’s progress on 
the reform agenda as well as its active participation in this framework. 
Moldovan national CS platform has been very active in proposing items 
on the policy agenda of the EaP, more active and advanced than the 
other national platforms: recently it is Moldova that has come with 
policy proposals on education, on integration of volunteers, on the 
ERASMUS+ programme, etc.20 
Level of participation in EU policies. The process of reform is also 
supported by Moldova’s participation in EU policies and programmes 
on migration, research, justice and security and other areas. For 
instance in 2008, the European Commission signed a Mobility 
Partnership (MP) with Moldova, one of two pilot countries. In January 
2011, the European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia 
Malmström, presented an Action Plan on visa liberalization. This is also 
in line with EU’s goal of preserving a safe Europe and ensuring the 
security of its citizens through cooperation with non-EU countries on 
issues like border management, migration, and asylum (European 
Union 2013a, 2013b). Since 2007, some 200 migration-related 
measures have been implemented. These projects range from effective 
governance of labour migration to protection and empowerment of 
victims of domestic violence and human trafficking. Many these 
migration-related actions have been implemented under the Mobility 
Partnership umbrella (to date, within this framework, 85 migration-
related initiatives have been or are carried out in various fields). 
Moldova also actively participates in the EaP working group on 
integrated border management and the structured dialogue on human 
rights between Moldova and the EU. Further, in late 2011, Moldova 
and the EU signed a Memorandum of Understanding on associating 
Moldova with the EU's Seventh Research Framework Programme (FP7). 
This allows scientists, research institutes, universities and companies 
from Moldova to collaborate with counterparts in the EU, in turn 
strengthening their research expertise and capacity. This is the only 
programme within which Moldova contributes to the EU’s budget on 
science and research.21 
Moldova also works together with EU agencies. Since 2008, the 
Moldovan Border Police Department has had cooperation with 
                                                          
20  Interviews with Moldovan civil society representatives, September-November 2013. 
21  Interview with Moldovan civil servant, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 2013. 
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FRONTEX (European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union), based on a working arrangement. This cooperation 
involves the Moldovan side contributing human and informational 
resources, with information exchange with FRONTEX on a monthly 
basis; further, implementation of FRONTEX risk analysis methodology 
by the Moldovan Border Police; participation in training, research and 
development; and joint operational measures. A strategic agreement 
between Moldova and EUROPOL (law enforcement cooperation) has 
been initiated, and an operational agreement with this EU agency is 
being negotiated. Moldova contributes with strategic information (on 
trends and methods used to commit offences, routes and changes in 
routes used by smugglers or those involved in illicit trafficking 
offences, etc.) and technical information (investigative procedures, 
criminal intelligence analytical methods, etc.). And finally, we note 
that EUROJUST submitted a draft agreement on cooperation with 
Moldova (judicial cooperation) in December 2013. 
An important additional step towards the integration of Moldova 
within the EU civil aviation safety system was taken in July 2009 with 
the signing of the Working Arrangement between the European 
Aviation Safety Agency and the civil aviation authorities of Moldova. In 
energy, Moldova successfully completed negotiations for its accession 
to the Energy Community in 2009. Cooperation with the EUBAM mis-
sion intensified significantly after a new Moldova/Ukraine customs 
regime was introduced in the course of 2006 (NIP Moldova 2011-2013: 
8).  
Concerning trade, Moldova has gained greater access to the EU 
Internal Market and is becoming a more integrated participant in the 
European economy. Since 2004, trade flows between the EU and 
Moldova have increased, as shown in Table 5. 
The ENP as an instrument for building a security community? The case of Moldova 19 
Table 5. Trade flows between the EU and Moldova (in EUR) 
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In 2012, the EU accounted for approximately half of Moldova's exports 
and imports (more than for any other EaP country), although the 
significance of Moldova as a trade partner for the EU remained 
negligible (less than 0.1% of EU total trade) (see Table 6). 
Table 6. Trade dependences between the EU and EaP partners  
 
Share of 
imports/exports 
2012 
Imports from EU 
as share of total 
imports 
Exports to EU 
as share of 
total exports 
Imports to EU 
as share of EU 
total imports 
Exports from EU 
as share of EU 
total exports 
Ukraine 40% 21% 0.8% 1.4% 
Belarus 20% 38% 0.3% 0.5% 
Moldova 45% 47% 0.1% 0.1% 
Azerbaijan 29% 54% 0.8% 0.2% 
Armenia 25% 35% 0% 0% 
Georgia 27% 24% 0% 0.1% 
 
Source: Authors' compilation of data from the European Commission, 
Directorate General TRADE. 
 
Bilateral trade flows increased, amounting to €2.7 billion in 2012. EU 
exports to Moldova consisted mainly of mineral fuels, electrical 
machinery and equipment. Main products exported from the EU to 
Moldova were electrical machinery and equipment, clothing and 
animal and vegetable fats and oils. Since 2008, exports from Moldova 
to the EU have benefited from the autonomous trade preferences (ATPs) 
system, which offers free access to the EU market for nearly all 
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products originating in Moldova (except certain agricultural products, 
for which limited concessions have been granted). Although the ATPs 
removed most tariff ceilings for the import of Moldovan industrial 
products into the EU, they served to ‘improve' EU market access only 
for agricultural products (Council Regulation 2008: 1). Quantitative 
limits on the import of key agricultural export goods from Moldova 
were maintained, including on sugar and wine, as well as fruit and nut 
products, f which constitute major export articles from Moldova to the 
EU. The DCFTA with Moldova abolishes most but also not all EU import 
quotas for Moldovan agricultural products (KAS 2013: 24–25). 
In the area of trade and trade-related issues, market and regulatory 
reform, Moldova does not participate in any EU policy/programme or 
agency as such, although it will be participating in the European Food 
Safety Agency's European Neighbourhood Program 2014–2016, and 
possibly also in programmes of the Office for Harmonization of the 
Internal Market, and the European Medicines Agency. In the future, 
Moldova can also participate in some of the new EU programmes 
2014–2020 of relevance to economic cooperation (subject to 
conditions), including COSME (Competitiveness of Enterprises and 
SMEs, Customs 2020 (functioning and modernization of the Customs 
Union), European Statistical Programme (development and production 
of European statistics) and Fiscalis 2020 (cooperation between tax 
administrations).22  
Level of socialization to EU norms and standards. Moldovans put a 
high premium on certain standards that stem from the EU – decision-
making transparency, human rights, freedom as individuals and 
freedom to start economic activities. The governmental programmes23 
reflect the expansion of EU rules and norms, and an EU-driven reform 
agenda: the main foreign policy objective remains EU integration, with 
new formal and social institutions overseeing the functional 
cooperation with the EU. Empirical data show that Moldova has left 
behind its Soviet institutional legacy (formal and social) which led to 
changes in Moldova’s social domestic security patterns in favour of 
European security norms. This is also reflected in the new governing 
pattern - that of a coalition government – although not always 
successful, strongly supported by the current government: 'ultimately 
it is a positive impact on our development, on our actions and the way 
we think' (Leancă, 2014).  
                                                          
22  See: http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/eu-programmes/index_en.htm (accessed 
30.1.2014). 
23  Deepening relations with the European Union and improving living standards of 
citizens are the main objectives of the 'European Integration: Freedom, Democracy, 
Welfare' programme of the Moldovan government for 2011-2014. 
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In the process of reform, Moldova’s participation in various EU 
policies and programmes becomes a socialization vehicle on the one 
hand, expanding EU liberal political norms and practices but also on 
the other, facilitating the processes of Europeanization. Moldova’s 
participation in EU programmes fosters a high degree of social learning 
and socialization. The country’s public institutions have become 
Europeanized.24 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has changed its name 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration. The 
Ministry of Internal Affairs is under reform, and institutions such as the 
Bureau of Migration and Asylum and Border Police, Customs, the 
Border Guards, Security Service and the Anti-corruption Centre, now 
working on the basis of EU procedures and not former military or 
political orders– in order to become more similar to their EU 
counterparts. These are not just changes on the surface. According to 
Moldovan civil society, ‘(…) those institutions that socialize more with 
the EU become more Europeanized and those that do not – like the 
Ministry of Agriculture or Transport – are least EU-socialized and do 
not show progress’.25 In addition, the Ministry of Justice fully supports 
the adoption of EU legal norm in Moldova’s legislative framework. As 
one public policy consultant noted, ‘a lot of Moldovan draft decisions 
make reference to Moldova’s commitments to the EU (…) or are inspired 
by the EU model’.26  
A further important sign of Europeanization is the police reform, 
being conducted in line with EU standards. This has  led to changes in 
the area of public order and security,27 accompanied by an increase in 
public trust in state institutions such as police. According to one 
representative of Moldovan civil society, ‘it is not the new uniforms or 
the cars, but that people no longer fear to walk on the same side of the 
street with the police’.28 Especially in the capital and the big cities there 
are a great many citizens who are well-informed about the EU, its 
institutions and values. In addition, large numbers of Moldovans live, 
study or work in the EU and are highly integrated and adapted into the 
EU system; European living standards seem to them the natural way 
forward.29 The greater level of development of formal and social 
institutions is also reflected in civil society organisations and the 
business community, who have become highly EU-socialized.  
                                                          
24  Interviews with Moldovan civil servants (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European 
Integration, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Regional Development and Construction, 
State Chancellery) and Moldovan civil society representatives (think-tanks and 
donors), September 2013. 
25  Interview with Moldovan civil society representatives, September 2013. 
26  Interview with Moldovan public policy consultant, September 2013. 
27  Interview with Moldova civil servant, Ministry of Internal Affairs, September 2013. 
28  Interview with Moldovan civil society representative, September 2013. 
29  Interview with Moldova civil servant, Ministry of Justice, September 2013. 
 The attractiveness of the EU to 
Moldova 
Although the Moldovan political elite tend to believe that the signing of 
the Association Agreement and the DCFTA has made the European 
integration process 'irreversible', the general population is split on 
whether to integrate further with the EU, or with the Russian Customs 
Union. The numbers of those favouring EU integration have increased 
in recent years, but the population remains divided as to joining the EU 
(in favour: 33% in 2011, 16.1% in 2012, 44.7% in 2013) or the 
Russian Customs Union (in favour: 45.6% in 2011, 22.5% in 2012, 
43% in 2013). Asked which should be a major strategic partner of 
Moldova, most people thought of Russia (60.5%) before the EU 
(23.2%).30 In contrast, the 58% of respondents saw the EU as the actor 
most effectively helping economic development in Moldova, as against 
25% who said it was the Single Economic Area with Russia.31 This 
indicates that integration into the EU is primarily associated with 
economic cooperation, whereas closer association with Russia is based 
on strategic considerations. This may open up space for further 
integration of Moldova into the EU's internal market, but reduce the 
chances for the EU to be recognized as a provider of (hard) security in 
the country.  
Benefits and access 
The EU’s support to Moldova (indicative amounts) through the ENP for 
2011–2013 was €273.7 million, which marks an increase of approx. 
€60 million compared to the financial period 2007–2010 (see Table 7).  
                                                          
30  Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2011, Institute for Public Policy, Chisinau: 
http://www.ipp.md/libview.php?l=en&idc=156&id=580 
31  EU Neighbourhood Barometer Autumn 2012:  http://www.enpi-
info.eu/maineast.php?id_type=3&id=433, accessed 30.1.2013. 
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Table 7. Financial Aid EU–Moldova 1991–2013 
 
 Total amount  
(million euro) 
Amount per inhabitant  
per year (EUR) 
TACIS (1991–2006) 186.45 3.27 
Humanitarian Aid (1999–2001) 5.5 – 
Food Security Program (2000–2006) 35.2 1.64 
ENPI (2007–2010) 209,7 19.63 
ENPI (2011–2013) 273.1 25.57 
 
Source: Author's compilation of data from NIP Moldova 2011–2013 and the EU 
Neighbourhood Info Centre 
 
EU has allocated more funds per capita to Moldova than it has to any 
other EaP country. Moldova has received EU financial support for 
regulatory reform and capacity building through the European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). In the NIP2011–
2013, the facilitation of the deep and comprehensive FTA became a 
priority in itself, with a budget of around €96–109 million (NIP 
Moldova 2011–13: 39; 24–27).32 Among the goals of the NIP are the 
approximation of TBT and SPS standards, the maintenance of 
comprehensive competition laws and implementing rules, ensuring an 
efficient (and open) public procurement system and even the 
harmonization to 'existing and future acquis in service sectors' such as 
financial services, transport, postal and courier services, 
telecommunications and the energy sector (ibid: 24). The receipt of €33 
million annually from the ENPI is, however, little more than a drop in 
the ocean, given the costs of adopting the EU's trade and trade-related 
acquis. Indeed, the costs of implementing SPS standards alone may 
easily reach €2 billion (Messerlin et al. 2011: 83), which is more than 
Moldova’s total public budget for 2013. 
Moldova’s growth model in previous years was based on the transfer 
of resources from abroad to accommodate fast-growing domestic 
investment and demand. Moldova’s economy depends on remittances 
for one third of its €4 billion GDP. This approach failed in 2008 as a 
direct consequence of the economic crisis. Remittances decreased by 
34% in the first half of 2009.  
As regards Transnistria, the EU has tried to encourage Moldovan 
stakeholders to channel parts of the ENPI assistance to their 
Transnistrian counterparts in the form of direct right-bank/left-bank 
confidence-building operations. However, this has not yielded visible 
results. In 2009, the Commission launched confidence-building pilot 
                                                          
32  The Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation (EaPIC) program provided 
additional funding of €28mil to Moldova for the period 2012–13, of which some 
funds were used to top-up existing funds for institution building projects. 
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projects involving civil society organizations (CSOs) from both sides of 
the conflict, as well as EU-based CSOs, funded by specific allocations. 
According to the Commission, 'this new approach has allowed concrete 
activities to be launched on the ground, to the satisfaction of both 
sides' (NIP Moldova 2011-2013: 11). 
Competition from other actors 
Russia remains an important factor determining the political and 
economic security of Moldova. Moldova is officially a member of the 
Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the CIS 
Charter on Economic Union. However, Moldova has never participated 
in any military aspects of CIS because of its status of neutrality. Russia 
has continued to maintain a military presence in the Transnistrian 
region of Moldova, despite previous agreements with Moldova and 
within OSCE and CAF to withdraw its troops and ammunition. Apart 
from its military presence in Transnistria, Russia is still Moldova's 
second largest trading partner, and main source of energy supplies.  
Moldovan energy dependence on Russian gas supplies is set to 
diminish from 2014 (by approx. one third), because of the new gas 
pipeline between Romania and Moldova, a project which also received 
€7mill. from the EU budget. Still, the remaining two thirds of Moldova's 
gas requirements will continue to be supplied directly by Russia.33 
Although Russia was initially not opposed to Moldova signing an FTA 
with the EU, it has since stepped up pressure for joining Customs Union 
and Single Economic Area (SEA) instead.  
Also the EU has also put pressure on Moldova. In 2007, then-
Commissioner for external relations and neighbourhood policy Benita 
Ferrero-Waldner stated that a free trade area with the EU would 
exclude the possibility for eastern ENP countries to join another 
regional free trade arrangement, such as with the Russian Federation 
(Zagorski 2011: 48–49). Moldova therefore find itself in a rather 
awkward situation. With half of its exports (and almost all agricultural 
produce) destined for the CIS and especially Russia, the prospect of – 
potentially – having to choose between a free trade area with the EU 
and with the SEA is not optimal for Moldova.  In addition to losses from 
decoupling a significant export market, the Moldovan economy would 
be likely to suffer from trade sanctions on its exports to the Customs 
Union/Single Economic Area.34 
                                                          
33  See: http://www.dw.de/eu-helps-moldova-reduce-dependence-on-russian-gas/a-
17050226, accessed 20.1.2014  
34  See for example the Russian-imposed import ban on Moldovan wines and spirits in 
September 2013: http://euobserver.com/foreign/121388, accessed 30.1.2014. 
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However, for successive Moldovan governments, the DCFTA (rather 
than EU membership as such) has become the symbol of a forward-
looking 'European' choice and future for the EaP countries, set up in 
opposition to the 'other' choice of turning back to the past and to a 
'post-Soviet' identity by joining the Russia-led Customs Union and 
Single Economic Area. An example of this discourse is found in a report 
on DCFTA implementation issued by the Moldovan government in 
2013:  
Moldova regards European integration as a fundamental priority of its 
domestic and foreign policies. The full achievement of this objective is 
expected to embark the country on a course of stability and prosperity 
(...) the government sees responsible implementation of the 
commitments deriving from the ‘European course’ as the most effective 
way to achieve internal transformation of the county. (CIB Report 
Moldova 2013:3) 
The European option is sometimes even constructed as a civilizational 
choice. As one Moldovan government official put it: ‘For Moldovans, 
EU norms and laws are considered as the highest level, thus Moldova 
needs to perform better to meet these standards. Moldova and the EU 
are part of the same continent and we need these EU laws and EU 
standards to be more EU and less Russia.’  
In other words, fulfilling the conditions attached to the AA and 
DCFTA has become a logical step in a process of becoming more 
European, with the adoption of the EU acquis (whatever it might be) 
being a necessary and logical process towards this end. Questioning 
the formal adaptation of any part of the EU's acquis therefore means 
questioning the 'European course' as a whole. It was and continues to 
be this powerful discourse on the European forward-looking choice 
versus the Russian backward looking choice and post-Soviet identity 
that lends authority and legitimacy to the EU, which in turn also allows 
Brussels to apply significant conditionality in the case of Moldova. 
 
 Conclusions 
Our analysis has shown that Moldova is certainly integrating with the 
EU's acquis communautaire, and is among the frontrunners in terms of 
political and economic reforms in the EaP region. Moldova’s 
integration (and socialization) to European norms and standards in the 
areas of democracy, the rule of law and justice, freedom and security is 
more advanced than its integration into the EU's trade and trade-
related acquis. As far as integration into the EU's internal market is 
concerned, we observe that Moldova is more dependent on trade with 
the EU than the other EaP countries, and that the DCFTA will abolish 
many, but not all, import quotas imposed by the EU on Moldovan 
agricultural products. Moreover, Moldova's economy is just as 
dependent on and integrated in the Russian market as it is as regards 
the EU market – a factor likely to complicate further economic 
integration with the EU's internal market. Political contacts between 
the EU and Moldova have qualitatively and quantitatively increased 
through the ENP and EaP. Moldova participates actively in EU 
initiatives, programmes and operations in the area of democracy, rule 
of law and justice, freedom and security, but less so in the area of trade 
and trade-related cooperation. Participation in working groups on 
migration or border management (via FRONTEX) have had had 
noticeable Europeanization effects, including the socialization to EU 
norms and standards of Moldovan officials. With these observations in 
mind, and taking into account the comprehensive scope of the AA and 
the DCFTA, we may therefore conclude that Moldova has indeed 
reached a certain level of integration  with the EU.  
Regarding the level of attraction, we have seen that the EU has 
allocated more funds per capita to Moldova than it has to any other EaP 
country, but that funds are unlikely to reduce the heavy costs involved 
in the implementation of the AA/DCFTA. Despite the powerful 
consensus among Moldovan political elites on further integration with 
the EU, the population is split over the question of EU membership 
versus further integration with Russia, and there are powerful business 
interests within the country that favour tighter economic integration 
with Russia.  
What does that mean for successfully building a security community 
between the EU and Moldova? The events unfolding in Ukraine since 
2013 have served as pertinent reminders that a country's level of 
approximation with the EU's acquis, its level of dependency on the 
EU's market and its level of participation in EU agencies/programs will 
not necessarily prevent the government from making a U-turn away 
from the path of European integration. We therefore suspect that 
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building a security community involves more than just EU external 
governance. The level of attraction certainly matters in the equation, 
especially since Russia has (re-)emerged as a 'competing' pole of 
attraction through its political and economic power in the region.  
In our opinion, there are two significant limitations to the EU's 
security community expansion to Moldova, and these apply equally to 
all other EaP counties. First, a mature security community must be 
based on high levels of diffuse reciprocity and shared security interests 
(Adler and Barnett 1996).35 The EU has shown little anticipation or 
'sharing' of Moldova's interests. Instead of fostering the development of 
the competitive capacities of Moldovan producers, the EU has 
prioritized the EU’s own interest in creating market access for the EU, 
which is likely to have negative effects on human security/poverty 
reduction. It can also be argued that the EU has in fact decreased not 
just the economic but also political security of Moldova vis-à-vis Russia 
by pushing Moldova to pursue exclusive trade relations with the EU, 
without considering the negative effects of a Moldovan withdrawal 
from Russia's sphere of influence. The perception that Moldova does 
not benefit economically from European integration has serious 
implications for the course of European integration. As one Moldovan 
observer remarked, had Moldova negotiated a 'better trade deal' in the 
DCFA, the parliamentary elections in 2014 would have been less 
important for the country's European integration course.  
Second, a mature security community is characterized by a high 
level of de- or re-securitization.36 Moldova's uneasy relationship with 
Russia reveals the limits of the de-securitization process in Moldova. 
The main motivation of Moldovan political elites in pursuing European 
integration has always been based on very traditional hard-security 
concerns: Russia is perceived as a security threat (state as a referent 
object), seen to threaten the territorial sovereignty and security of 
Moldova, especially in discourses on the frozen conflict in Transnistria 
and restrictions on Moldovan migrant workers in Russia.37 All these 
                                                          
35  In a security community, states build generally accepted standards of behaviour. 
These standards exert their own normative pressure on state action, contributing to 
the development of long-term obligations between states. Thus in a system of 
diffuse reciprocity, states need not seek the immediate benefit guaranteed by 
specific reciprocity, but can act in the confidence that their cooperative actions will 
be repaid in the long run. 
36  In the words of Ole Waever, security was gradually squeezed out as a strong 
concern among the states, and Western Europe thus became a security community 
(or 'asecurity' community) (...) Most of the remaining security concerns were in 
post-sovereign patterns pushed towards referents other than state-to-state 
relations' (Waever 1998: 104). 
37 Some civil servants argue that the strong motivation to reform according to EU 
conditionality stems from geopolitical considerations: ‘the main motivation for 
Moldova to reform is its geopolitical situation'. (Interview with Moldovan 
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issues are of high political sensitivity in Moldova. They have the 
potential to cause serious tensions within the country, which can be 
fuelled if the EU fails to recognize or respond to the hard-security 
concerns of Moldova.38 
We therefore argue that Moldova has not yet become locked into an 
irreversible process of European integration. It remains conceivable 
that, without the prospect of meaningful reciprocity in relations with 
the EU in the long term, Moldova (much like Ukraine) may weigh the 
short-term costs of cooperation with the EU against the costs of an 
alternative (short-term) course of action (e.g. non-implementation of 
EU legislation). The most likely reason why Moldova (unlike Ukraine) 
has not yet defected from the AA/DCFTA process lies in the very strong 
European identity dimension underpinning Moldova's engagement 
with the EU, which has so far sealed up gaps like the lack of shared 
economic and security interests. It remains to be seen how strong that 
glue will prove to be in the future. 
                                                                                                                                        
government officials (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Ministry 
of Justice), September 2013). 
38  For example, the EU removed the position of a special representative of the EU for 
the Transnistrian conflict (active post 2007-2011). In 2013 the EU appointed a 
political officer within the EU Delegation in Moldova in charge of the Transnistrian 
case, but the officer went on  leave after only 3 months of work (Interview with EU 
official, November 2013)  
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